---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Consumer
status: done
latency_ms: 351309
conversation_id: 900d0890-cc09-497d-afb6-333891be1953
citations: 14
created: 2026-05-31 22:19:19Z
---

# How does 99 speedmart’s valuation compare to peers, and what justifies its premium/discount?

## 99 Speed Mart (5326 MK / 99SMART) — Valuation vs Peers

### 1. The headline number — where 99SMART trades vs. local listed peers

CLSA does **not have direct coverage of 99 Speed Mart** — it is treated as a "non-rated" peer in their Malaysia consumer franchise. The reference valuation anchor on the IPO and post-listing was sourced from sell-side consensus:

| Stock | Ticker | CLSA Rating | Valuation Anchor | Multiple |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **99 Speed Mart** | 99SMART (5326 MK) | **Not covered** | Consensus forward PE at IPO | **~29x forward PE** [1] |
| Mr DIY | MRDIY MK | O-PF | DCF (WACC 7.5%, beta 0.7) → TP RM2.42; trading ref. mean | ~32x (5-yr mean) [2][8] |
| Mynews Holdings | MNHB MK | O-PF (was SELL) | 18x → 20x PE target multiple (FY26CL) | **20x target** [7]; prior 18x [6] |

→ Read literally, **99SMART's IPO/post-IPO multiple (~29x consensus fwd PE) sits between Mr DIY's ~32x five-year mean and Mynews' ~18–20x** [1][2][7] — i.e. a *modest discount* to the regional category-killer Mr DIY but a sizeable *premium* to the convenience-store-pivot story Mynews.

The market gave the multiple credibility immediately: 99SMART rose from a RM1.65 IPO price to ~RM2.25 by 1 Oct 24 (+36%) while Mr DIY drifted from RM2.05 to RM2.08 over the same window [4]. CLSA labelled 99SMART **"the new consumer sector darling,"** noting "shareholders who bought into the IPO would have seen a 37% gain by the end of September" [4].

### 2. Why a premium to Mynews / convenience-store comps is justified

**(a) Scale & market leadership — by an unusually wide margin.** The Frost & Sullivan IMR in the prospectus pegs 99 Holdings at:
- **40.1% share of the Malaysian mini-market industry** in 2023, and **11.6% of the broader RM79.5bn grocery-based retail industry** [11]
- **2,651 outlets** as at 15 Jul 2024 — versus the **next-largest chain mini-market operator (Econsave) at just 79 outlets**, BilaBila Mart at 55, Giant Mini at 39, and myNEWS SUPERVALUE at 34 [13]

This is closer to a one-firm oligopoly than a competitive equilibrium — there is no meaningful #2 in chain mini-markets. CLSA's own consumer survey confirms the consumer-level pull: **42% of Malaysian Zillennials report shopping at 99 Speedmart / KK Mart**, ranked #2 only behind AEON/Giant/Lotus hypermarkets at 60% [10].

**(b) Operational quality flags vs grocery peers.** Per the prospectus IMR, 99 Holdings "has among the **fastest revenue CAGR** in the prior three years," with a "**high PBT margin** in the latest financial year [indicating] the Company operates efficiently" and "a **low inventory turnover period**" [12]. That trio — top-line growth, margin, and capital efficiency — is precisely the combination that warrants a multiple expansion vs Mynews (which has been hovering near break-even and lacks scale).

**(c) Structural cost advantage.** "By leveraging on its high number of outlets and the large sales volume, 99 Holdings is able to achieve economies of scale and negotiate better supply terms, reducing its costs per item allowing it to sell its products at a competitive price. These factors help to solidify 99 Holdings' leading position in the market and make it challenging for other players to compete on pricing." [14] CLSA explicitly identifies 99 Speedmart as the dominant headwind for Mynews — Mynews's pivot into minimarkets faces "large competitors (namely 99 Speedmart) benefitting from larger scale and lower prices" [5].

**(d) Defensive growth narrative.** CLSA highlights 99 Speedmart (alongside Farm Fresh and AEON) as a non-rated name that demonstrated **resilience tied to staples spending** after the 2024 EPF withdrawals — i.e. a value-for-money story whose earnings hold up in a weak consumer cycle [9]. That justifies a defensive premium relative to consumer-discretionary peers.

### 3. Why the multiple is NOT higher (the "discount to global comp" frame)

- **Mr DIY trades at ~32x mean PE** [2] despite being in non-grocery (specialty value retail). 99SMART at ~29x sits *below* Mr DIY — explainable by: (i) grocery's structurally lower gross margin vs Mr DIY's value-retail mix, (ii) Mr DIY's longer track record and listed history, and (iii) Mr DIY's longer runway of new-store openings outside Klang Valley (its DCF terminal growth assumption is supported by a 5-yr revenue CAGR plan to RM11.9bn by 2035 [8]).
- **No private-call / expert-network coverage** of 99SMART in the org's archive, and CLSA has not initiated coverage — meaning the multiple is consensus-driven without a deep bull/bear sell-side debate yet. This typically caps how much *further* the multiple can stretch until earnings prove out.
- **Penetration ceiling.** Mini-market segment size in Malaysia is RM23.0bn (2023), forecast to reach RM29.8bn by 2028 (~5–6% CAGR) — a respectable but not explosive TAM, capping the terminal multiple investors are willing to pay.

### 4. Bottom line — what the premium/discount mix actually reflects

99 Speed Mart's ~29x forward PE [1] represents a **scale-and-defensiveness premium versus convenience-store and supermarket peers (Mynews 18–20x [6][7]; AEON/hypermarkets even lower)** and a **discount to Mr DIY's ~32x mean [2]**, justified by:

| Premium drivers (justify the 29x level) | Discount factors (cap upside vs MRDIY) |
|---|---|
| 40.1% mini-market share, **~33× the next operator** by outlet count [11][13] | Grocery's structurally lower GM vs specialty value retail |
| Fastest revenue CAGR among grocery retailers [12] | No CLSA / mainstream sell-side initiation yet |
| In-house logistics → cost advantage [13] | Mini-market TAM growing only ~5–6% CAGR |
| Documented consumer pull (42% household reach) [10] | Limited international expansion narrative |
| Resilient staples-spending profile [9] | Mr DIY has longer trading history and broader investor recognition |

The way to read it: the market is paying for 99SMART **as the unrivalled scale leader in a defensive staples category** — not as a high-growth disruptor. The multiple is anchored to Mr DIY's franchise multiple but a tier below it, while the gap to convenience-store peers like Mynews reflects the gulf in scale, profitability, and competitive moat that the prospectus and CLSA both document.

---
**Sources**
[1][2] CLSA — Mr DIY (O-PF, IF24: Interest still strong), 16 Sep 2024 — 607939660LinqAlpha.PDF
[3] CLSA — Malaysia Market (Malaysia as we see it—Sep 2024), 1 Oct 2024 — 607940535LinqAlpha.PDF (99 Speedmart "consumer sector darling")
[4] CLSA — Malaysia Market (Sep 2024) — 99 Speed Mart vs Mr DIY price action table, 607940535LinqAlpha.PDF
[5] CLSA — Asia Consumer (CLSA Consumer Monthly), 17 Apr 2024 — 607926846LinqAlpha.PDF
[6] CLSA — Mynews (SELL, Stayed profitable), 25 Mar 2024 — 607925111LinqAlpha.PDF (18x PE)
[7] CLSA — Malaysia consumer (The Malaysian Zillennial), 2 Feb 2025 — 607949463LinqAlpha.PDF (Mynews 20x PE)
[8] CLSA — Mr DIY DCF target price derivation (Figure 7), 16 Sep 2024 — 607939660LinqAlpha.PDF
[9] CLSA — Malaysia consumer (Zillennial), 2 Feb 2025 — 607949463LinqAlpha.PDF (Farm Fresh, 99 Speedmart, AEON resilience)
[10] CLSA — Malaysian Zillennial survey, store-share %, 2 Feb 2025 — 607949463LinqAlpha.PDF
[11] 99 Speed Mart IPO Prospectus / Frost & Sullivan IMR Report — Market share (40.1% mini-market, 11.6% grocery retail, 2023)
[12] 99 Speed Mart IPO Prospectus / Frost & Sullivan IMR Report — Revenue CAGR, PBT margin, inventory turnover
[13] 99 Speed Mart IPO Prospectus / Frost & Sullivan IMR Report — 2,651 outlets vs peers (Econsave 79, BilaBila 55, Giant Mini 39, myNEWS SUPERVALUE 34)
[14] 99 Speed Mart IPO Prospectus / Frost & Sullivan IMR Report — Economies of scale, supply-term negotiation, pricing moat

## Citations

- [1] **607939660LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/09/607939660LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [2] **607939660LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/09/607939660LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [3] **607940535LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/11/607940535LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [4] **607940535LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/11/607940535LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [5] **607926846LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/04/607926846LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [6] **607925111LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/03/607925111LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [7] **607949463LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/02/607949463LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [8] **607939660LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/09/607939660LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [9] **607949463LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/02/607949463LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [10] **607949463LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/02/607949463LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [11] **99 Holdings Prospectus (Part 1)** · external
- [12] **99 Holdings Prospectus (Part 1)** · external
- [13] **99 Holdings Prospectus (Part 1)** · external
- [14] **99 Holdings Prospectus (Part 1)** · external

