---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Technology
status: done
latency_ms: 179084
conversation_id: 45d1b315-b0d3-49b3-9b14-c8eb085ad77a
citations: 9
created: 2026-05-31 19:32:46Z
---

# What is Grab’s core business franchise and the key components of its operating model?

# Grab Holdings (GRAB US) — Core Business Franchise & Operating Model

## 1. The Franchise — Southeast Asia's leading Superapp

Grab is Southeast Asia's leading **on-demand Superapp**, operating across **8 countries / 480+ cities** with **~32 million monthly transacting users (MTUs), 4 million registered merchant partners and 5 million registered driver partners** on platform [9]. The company sells everyday-use services into a single mobile interface; CLSA classifies the business under three reportable segments — **Deliveries, Mobility, and Financial Services** — and values each separately in its SOTP framework [1][7].

### Geographic mix (FY24 revenue contribution per CLSA)

| Country | % of FY24 Group Revenue |
|---|---|
| Malaysia | 29% |
| Indonesia | 23% |
| Singapore | 21% |
| Philippines | 9% |
| Thailand | 9% |
| Vietnam | 8% |

Source: [5]. Group FY24 GMV split: **Deliveries US$11,723m / Mobility US$6,640m** (group US$18,363m) [5].

---

## 2. Segment Economics — the three core P&L pillars

CLSA's segment-level view of the franchise (1Q25 actuals + forward forecasts):

| Segment | Model | FY24 Segment Adj. EBITDA margin | 1Q25 YoY GMV | 1Q25 YoY Segment Adj. EBITDA | CLSA 3-yr GMV CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Mobility** | On-demand ride-hailing (cars + 2-wheelers); take-rate-driven | **8.57%** [5] | +17% [4] | +15% [4] | ~13% [3] |
| **Deliveries** | Food, grocery (Mart + Supermarket "gray-store"), parcels | **1.67%** [5] | +16% [4] | +50% [4] | ~10% / ~13% [3] |
| **Financial Services** | Wallets (GrabPay), PayLater, lending/cash advances, insurance, digibanks (GXS SG, GXBank MY, Bank Fama ID) | EBITDA-negative (US$30m adj. EBITDA loss in 1Q25 vs US$28m in 1Q24) [4] | n/a | Loss-making | n/a |

- 1Q25 group revenue **US$773m (+47% YoY)** on GMV of **US$4.9bn (+16%)**; group adjusted EBITDA reached **US$106m** (vs US$62m in 1Q24) [4].
- Management raised 2025 adjusted EBITDA guidance to **US$460–480m** (from US$430–470m) and maintained US$3.3–3.4bn revenue guidance [4].
- CLSA characterises Grab's **~9% adjusted EBITDA margin as "industry leading"** in the regional on-demand peer set, with adj. EBITDA forecast at **US$463–885m across 2025–27 (vs US$313m in 2024)** [3].

---

## 3. The Operating Model — five mechanics that make the franchise work

### (a) Superapp cross-sell engine ("4 core segments" wheel)
Management explicitly frames the operating model around **"4 core segments"** unified by the Superapp interface — driving consumer cross-sell and partner loyalty [10]. Quantitatively, **62% of MTUs use 2+ services**, and **users on 4+ services carry annual retention >87%** [11] — i.e., the platform's incremental services compound LTV rather than cannibalise.

### (b) Two-sided, multi-vertical supply pool
Drivers are not segregated by service. **>2/3 of drivers actively toggle between rides, food and parcel deliveries** to maximise earnings [12]. This is structurally differentiated vs monoline peers (Uber rides, Doordash food, Deliveroo food) because it raises utilisation per driver-hour and gives Grab a cost-to-serve advantage in markets where post-COVID driver supply has been tight [12].

### (c) Subscription + corporate-channel monetisation
- **GrabUnlimited** subscription now accounts for **~19% of GMV**, with food spend ~2.5x and mobility spend ~2x higher among subscribers — without sacrificing margin [13].
- **GrabForBusiness** (corporate B2B channel) lifts mobility usage ~2.3x and food deliveries ~2.1x within onboarded firms (per management) [13].
- **Affordability initiatives** (Shared Saver in deliveries, value-tier mobility products) are the current MTU growth lever — but, per CLSA, the price-down push is also why **margin is likely to remain "range-bound"** despite GMV momentum [2][8].

### (d) Proprietary technology stack
The "tech moat" is concrete and quantified by management:
- **GrabMaps** — fully self-reliant mapping across all 8 markets; replaced third-party mapping providers (saving "tens of millions" in licence costs) and is now monetised externally (Microsoft Azure/Bing partnership for SE Asia data) [16].
- **Credit-scoring platform** — proprietary ML models trained on platform-internal data (driver earnings cadence, merchant payment-flow, safety record) allowing lending to the **~60% unbanked / ~90% credit-underserved** regional population [15]. Scores refreshed daily; at any point ~30% of active driver partners use a Grab credit product [15].
- **Anti-fraud** — in-house ML runs **>1bn fraud checks daily**, >99% with real-time verdict; extended to cover **GXS Bank (Singapore)** [16].

### (e) Financial services flywheel attached to the on-demand ecosystem
Management's framing is explicit: fintech is a **flywheel on top of the on-demand business**, not a standalone bet [17]. The structural edges they cite:
- **Distribution**: zero incremental channel cost — the **32m consumers / 5m drivers / 4m merchants** are already inside the app [14].
- **Credit edge**: unconventional data (income streams, sales seasonality, safety record) → superior Gini on credit models; cash advances have collections priority over driver/merchant payouts ("right to subtract the income they're getting from the platform first to repay the loans") [14].
- **Digibanks** as the scaling vehicle: GXS (SG), GXBank (MY) and stake in Bank Fama (ID) are positioned as the next-stage growth layer leveraging on-platform liabilities + on-platform credit underwriting [reference to Hungate's framing, [17]].

---

## 4. How CLSA values the franchise (operating-model translation into EV)

CLSA uses a **sum-of-the-parts (SOTP)** valuation that mirrors the segment structure — confirming the three-segment construction is how the Street thinks about the franchise [7]:

| Segment (2025CL basis) | Methodology | Multiple | EBITDA / Sales | EV (US$m) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Deliveries | EV/EBITDA | ~15x | EBITDA 236 (uses 2026CL Ebitda, then discounted back) | 3,174 |
| Mobility | EV/EBITDA | ~21x | EBITDA 488 | 10,414 |
| Financial Services | EV/Sales | ~7x | Adj. net sales 344 (EBITDA still –266) | 2,406 |
| **Total EV** | | | | **15,995** |
| Less NCI | | | | (800) |
| Add net cash | | | | 5,987 |
| **Equity value** | | | | **21,182** |
| Value per share | | | | **US$5.25** |

Source: [1]. Mobility and Deliveries are valued at a **~15% premium to global peers** to reflect category leadership and the Superapp cross-sell moat [7]. The on-demand businesses (Mobility + Deliveries) contribute **~85% of EV**; Financial Services contributes ~15% and is still in investment mode [1].

---

## 5. The CLSA view in one paragraph (June 2025 vintage)

Per CLSA's latest trading-update note (9-Jun-2025), **April–May 2025 on-demand GMV is tracking at the higher end of consensus**, supported by deeper penetration from affordability initiatives across mobility and deliveries — but management has reiterated it is **not in talks to acquire GoTo**, removing the most obvious near-term catalyst for Indonesia margin expansion [2]. CLSA rates Grab **O-PF (Outperform vs market) with US$5.25 TP** [1][8].

---

**Sources**
[1] Grab — O-PF (Growth & profitability equilibrium) — CLSA (30 Apr 2025) — 607957730LinqAlpha.PDF
[2] Grab — O-PF (Grab provides trading update) — CLSA (9 Jun 2025) — 607961587LinqAlpha.PDF
[3] Grab — O-PF (EPS has potential to outperform) — CLSA (24 Apr 2025) — 607956786LinqAlpha.PDF
[4] Grab — O-PF (Growth & profitability equilibrium) — CLSA (30 Apr 2025) — 607957730LinqAlpha.PDF
[5] Grab — O-PF (Navigating M&A) — CLSA (20 May 2025) — 607959955LinqAlpha.PDF
[6] Grab — O-PF (EPS has potential to outperform) — CLSA (24 Apr 2025) — 607956786LinqAlpha.PDF
[7] Grab — O-PF (Growth & profitability equilibrium) — CLSA (30 Apr 2025) — 607957730LinqAlpha.PDF
[8] Grab — O-PF (Growth & profitability equilibrium) — CLSA (30 Apr 2025) — 607957730LinqAlpha.PDF
[9–17] Grab Holdings Limited — Analyst/Investor Day (earnings call transcript, public)

## Citations

- [9] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [10] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [11] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [12] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [13] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [14] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [15] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [16] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external
- [17] **Grab Holdings Limited - Analyst/Investor Day** · external

