---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Capital Goods
status: done
latency_ms: 247783
conversation_id: a73e3105-82f9-4bdd-a732-d0b7e7205986
citations: 6
created: 2026-05-31 20:00:52Z
---

# What catalysts could drive upside/downside for Doosan Enerbility in the next 12–18 months?

# Doosan Enerbility (034020 KS) — 12–18 Month Catalyst Map

**Latest CLSA stance** (27-May-2025): **Outperform**, TP **₩47,000** (raised from ₩34,000), but **downgraded from High-Conviction Outperform** on price action — stock had rallied **127.3% YoY / 48.7% in the preceding month** [1]. Note CLSA corpus in this workspace ends 29-Jun-2025, so "current" stance reflects that vintage; live data is now ~11 months newer.

---

## I. UPSIDE CATALYSTS

### 1. Czech Republic Nuclear (Dukovany 5&6) — the largest single near-term order
- KHNP (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power) signed the **main EPC contract with the Czech client (EDU II) for Dukovany Units 5 & 6 on 4-Jun-2025** following Czech government budget approval on 30-Apr-2025; total project size ~**₩26 trn**, Doosan's guided portion **₩3.8 trn (major equipment only)** with CLSA noting "actual order size is likely to be higher" [3].
- This was Team Korea's **first European nuclear export** and the first Korean nuclear export since UAE Barakah in 2009 [3].
- Doosan's bookable orders typically lag the main KHNP–government contract by **~6 months**, so the order should hit Doosan's books **in 2H25** [4]. The 25.4Q forecast pegs Czech 2-unit at **₩3.8 trn** within a ₩4.4 trn Nuclear-segment quarterly order target [13]. **By 1Q26 the company confirmed Czech Nuclear Construction and SMR contracts were underway** [17].
- *Watch*: legal complications around the Czech award timeline (delays were a major share-price headwind in early 2025) [2].

### 2. SMR (Small Modular Reactor) — multi-front growth path
- **NuScale**: Doosan already received **long-lead material orders for 12 SMR modules**; main equipment orders + additional long-lead materials for **6 more modules expected in 2025**. Mid-term targets include UAE, Saudi Arabia, Korea SMR, and Westinghouse (Poland or Bulgaria) [2].
- **US pipeline through NuScale**: in discussions for **3 US projects**, some sized at up to **12 modules each**. Financing risk (the Rumanian-project bottleneck) is alleviated in the US by big-tech demand [5].
- **Capacity expansion**: Changwon currently handles **12 modules**; explicit plan to scale to **20 units**, with capacity additions in 10- or 20-module increments (Changwon primary, North America/Europe under review) [6].
- **TerraPower Kemmerer #1** (Wyoming) FOAK construction approved by NRC; Rolls-Royce Wylfa 3-unit project signed; Czech Temelin first SMR Early Works Contract signed with ČEZ — all expand the SMR supplier opportunity Doosan is positioned to capture [15].
- **Korea-domestic SMR**: i-SMR 4 modules planned for **2028** orders; **2 large units** in the 11th Basic Power Plan slated for **2029** [7].

### 3. US Gas Turbine Breakthrough — narrative shift
- Doosan is **actively discussing 10 gas turbines (~8 GW)** with multiple US datacentre developers; first US gas turbine order targeted for **2025** [6].
- **2026 capacity is already fully booked**, with reservation fees already received funding capex. US exports are not yet in the business plan, so success here is pure upside to guidance. A more concrete update was expected after Jul–Aug 2025 [5].

### 4. Backlog & Mid-Term Earnings Step-Up
- Order backlog targeted to reach **~₩48 tn by 2030** [12]. Headline guidance trajectory:

| Metric | 2026 (P) | 2030 (P) | Δ |
|---|---|---|---|
| Orders (₩ tn) | 13.3 | 16.4 | +23% |
| Sales (₩ tn) | 7.4 | 11.7 | +58% |
| EBIT (₩ bn / %) | 396 (5.4%) | 1,153 (11.7%) | +191% / +4.5ppt |

- Mid-term order plan **upgraded** to ₩4.9 tn avg/yr ('26-'30) from ₩4.2 tn ('25-'29), driven by SMR momentum and expanded AP1000 projects. **K-standard NPP** assumes 2 new domestic + 4 export units; **AP1000** assumes ~50% of WEC's planned North America/Europe volumes [12]. **1Q26 orders of ₩2.8 tn** (driven by domestic & overseas DGTs/STGs) put the company on track [17].

### 5. US Policy & AP1000 Tailwind
- Trump's executive orders target **expanding nuclear capacity from 100GW to 400GW by 2050, including 10 new large NPPs by 2030**; US Commerce Department committed **US$80 bn to AP1000 deployment** [14].
- **Fermi America (Texas AI Campus, 4 AP1000 units)**: Doosan signed **forging material production contract in Oct 2025**; Fermi listed on NASDAQ/LSE Oct '25; 2032 start-up target with licensing in progress [14].
- Duke Energy planning **2+ large NPP units by 2035**; Santee Cooper MOU for V.C. Summer restart feasibility [14].
- AP1000 is the only PWR design Doosan supplies for under MANUGA; 6 reactor vessels and 12 steam generators already delivered — Doosan is the **sole supplier of reactors and steam generators** for the program [14].

### 6. "TSMC of Nuclear" Strategic Positioning
- CLSA frames Doosan as positioning to be the **global nuclear foundry / partner to all nuclear OEMs**, technology-agnostic, with dedicated SMR facilities (notably NuScale) — broadening the addressable market beyond Team Korea [11].
- **Catalyst (CLSA explicit)**: "Securing nuclear power projects by Team Korea will be a catalyst. But Doosan could also receive equipment orders from non-Korean companies." [10]

---

## II. DOWNSIDE RISKS

### 1. Legacy Earnings Drag — already realised in 1Q25
- 1Q25 OP was **₩142 bn — 45.6% below consensus** — driven by a Vietnam coal project loss [9].
- EBIT temporarily weighed by **completion of large coal and water projects** and the product-mix transition; growth businesses are scheduled to ramp into 2H. Annual guidance reaffirmed on the assumption that ~92% of FY25 sales come from end-FY24 backlog [16].

### 2. Czech Order Slippage Risk
- Initial guidance was **March 2025**; political turmoil in Prague pushed it back, with the actual Doosan booking pushed to **2H25** (post the main KHNP–Czech contract by ~6 months). Any further legal challenges (Westinghouse litigation, EU procurement reviews, change of government) would push earnings recognition further [4].

### 3. US Tariff / Trade Policy Risk
- On a **parent basis**, US exposure is small for now (US gas turbine and SMR business not yet booked). But on a **consolidated basis**, Doosan Bobcat — the major earnings contributor — generates **over 70% of revenue in the US**. Long-term SMR/gas turbine US exports could see complications under Trump-era tariffs [8].

### 4. Domestic Korean Policy Risk
- Opposition-party (now ruling) government raised concerns of a Moon-era-style nuclear roll-back; CLSA's view is the new admin is **less harsh** than the Moon government and even supportive of SMRs, but the risk is non-zero — domestic large nuclear orders are scheduled for 2028/2029 [7]. The Korean new admin has confirmed continuation of new NPP construction per the 11th Power Supply Plan [14].

### 5. SMR Commercialization Risk
- NuScale is **still pre-revenue**, needs to secure a first committed customer (TVA-ENTRA1 PPA being closely watched). If NuScale's commercialisation slips, the 12-module long-lead order Doosan already has could be the high-water mark for that customer through 2026.

### 6. Valuation & Already-Priced-In Risk
- The 127.3% YoY rally was the explicit reason CLSA **downgraded from HC O-PF to O-PF** in May 2025 — Doosan has been re-rated to price in much of the upside. Any execution miss on Czech timing, US gas turbine conversion, or NuScale customer wins could trigger sharp profit-taking [1].

### 7. Capacity Bottlenecks
- Gas turbine capacity expansion is "currently underway" but management acknowledged **bottlenecks** that need to be resolved before additional orders can be secured. The 8GW US datacentre discussions are contingent on this [5].

### 8. Net Debt / Working Capital
- Net debt rose materially in 1Q25; the business model is "inherently front-loaded" with significant cash outflows in early project phases. Management targeted net debt reduction to **₩2.6 tn by year-end** but execution risk remains [5].

---

## III. KEY EVENTS TO TRACK (12–18 Months)

| Window | Event | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| 2H25–1H26 | Czech Dukovany Units 5&6 Doosan equipment booking | Single largest near-term order (₩3.8 tn+) [3] |
| 2H25–2026 | First US gas turbine order from datacentre developer | Validates 8GW pipeline; unlocks order intake above guidance [6] |
| 2025–2026 | NuScale main equipment + additional long-lead (6 modules) | Confirms US SMR commercialisation path [2] |
| 2026 | TerraPower Kemmerer #1 construction ramp-up | Validates FOAK SMR project; Doosan supply chain involvement [15] |
| 2026–2027 | UAE / Saudi / additional Westinghouse AP1000 awards | Mid-term order plan upside [2][14] |
| 2026 | Trump EO follow-on rule-making (NRC easing) | Accelerates US large-NPP order conversion [14] |
| 2026 | Fermi America AP1000 forging material progress | Indicator of US AP1000 supply chain build-out [14] |
| 2028–2029 | Domestic i-SMR (4 modules) and 11th Basic Plan (2 units) orders | Korea domestic backlog [7] |

---

## Summary Read

The **upside case** rests on a multi-year nuclear renaissance where Doosan is the only Korean OEM with both K-standard PWR experience and an embedded SMR position (NuScale + TerraPower + Westinghouse AP1000) — with Czech as the proof point, US gas turbine as a near-term margin lever, and 2030 backlog of ~₩48 tn underpinning ~12% EBIT margins. The **downside case** is that (a) the stock has already rallied 127% and prices much of this in, (b) Czech slips further and US gas turbine doesn't convert in 2025, (c) NuScale's customer commercialisation drags into 2027, and (d) US tariffs hit consolidated earnings via Bobcat. CLSA's net stance — Outperform but downgraded from HC — captures this risk-reward: the structural story remains intact, but the asymmetric upside has narrowed at current levels.

---

**Sources**
[1] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025) — 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF
[2] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025) — 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF
[3] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (01-May-2025) — 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF
[4] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (Sanity check) — CLSA (07-Apr-2025) — 607955198LinqAlpha.PDF
[5] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (01-May-2025) — 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF
[6] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (01-May-2025) — 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF
[7] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (Sanity check) — CLSA (07-Apr-2025) — 607955198LinqAlpha.PDF
[8] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (Sanity check) — CLSA (07-Apr-2025) — 607955198LinqAlpha.PDF
[9] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (01-May-2025) — 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF
[10] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025) — 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF
[11] Korea nuclear energy (Korea leg quick takeaways) — CLSA (20-May-2025) — 607959940LinqAlpha.PDF
[12] Doosan Enerbility Q4 2025 Report — Doosan Enerbility (FY2025 results / mid-term plan)
[13] Doosan Enerbility 3Q 2025 Earnings Release — Doosan Enerbility (Sep-2025)
[14] Doosan Enerbility 3Q 2025 Earnings Release — Doosan Enerbility (Sep-2025)
[15] Doosan Enerbility Q1 2026 Report — Doosan Enerbility (1Q 2026)
[16] Doosan Enerbility 1Q 2025 Earnings Release — Doosan Enerbility (1Q 2025)
[17] Doosan Enerbility Q1 2026 Report — Doosan Enerbility (1Q 2026)

## Citations

- [12] **Doosan Enerbility Co., Ltd., Q4 2025 Report** · external
- [13] **_Doosan Enerbility_'25 3Q Earnings Release_vFF.pdf** · external
- [14] **_Doosan Enerbility_'25 3Q Earnings Release_vFF.pdf** · external
- [15] **Doosan Enerbility Co., Ltd., Q1 2026 Report** · external
- [16] **Doosan Enerbility_'25 1Q Earnings Release.pdf** · external
- [17] **Doosan Enerbility Co., Ltd., Q1 2026 Report** · external

