---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Capital Goods
status: done
latency_ms: 252231
conversation_id: 21c808cf-48ac-44af-a493-6dd637dddcd6
citations: 4
created: 2026-05-31 20:01:17Z
---

# What is the investment thesis for Doosan Enerbility in the current market environment?

# Doosan Enerbility (034020 KS) — Investment Thesis in the Current Market Environment

**Current price (latest internal data point, 27-May-2025):** ₩31,000-area range area-share-price; subsequent FactSet/StreetAccount snapshots show shares at **KRW 112,100 (18-May-2026)** and **KRW 134,900 (07-May-2026)** — a 52-week +394% move that has continued well beyond CLSA's last published view [9][6]. **CLSA target: ₩47,000 (rating: O-PF, downgraded from HC O-PF on price action in 27-May-2025 note)** [1]. **FactSet average street TP: KRW 144,032; range KRW 95,000–195,000** [9].

> Note on vintage: CLSA's last note in the corpus is 27-May-2025 (`MAX(published_date)` of matched set). The latest sell-side data point in the corpus is LS Securities' Buy initiation at **KRW 150,000 TP, +34% upside** dated 18-May-2026 [9]. Internal RMS coverage may therefore lag the current market-clearing thesis embedded in the share price.

---

## 1. The Core Bull Case — "The TSMC of Nuclear" in a Global Reactor Build Cycle

Doosan Enerbility is the **only Korean OEM with the heavy forging, RPV (reactor pressure vessel), steam generator, and turbine-island manufacturing capability** for both conventional Gen-III reactors AND SMRs. CLSA's May-20-2025 plant visit framed this as Korea's strategic positioning: *"South Korea is uniquely positioned to expand its services for global nuclear facilities… Team Korea aims to and has the capability to expand its global presence,"* with Doosan's Changwon facility scale described as *"simply astonishing"* [20].

**Three demand vectors converge in the current environment:**

| Vector | Status | Sizing |
|---|---|---|
| **Conventional nuclear (KHNP/Team Korea)** | Czech Republic main contract approved by Czech govt 30-Apr-2025; signed 7-May-2025 [13]. 16 years since Korea last exported a NPP (UAE Barakah 2009) [13]. | Total project ~₩26trn; Doosan guides ₩3.8trn order (likely higher) [13] |
| **SMR (NuScale-anchored)** | Already received LLM order for **12 modules**; expects main equipment orders + LLM for an additional 6 modules in 2025 [3]. Capacity expansion underway from current 12 modules at Changwon [15]. Also TerraPower (Bill Gates) feasibility contract; preferred-vendor deal with Candu Energy [7] | Mid-term: UAE, Saudi Arabia, Korea i-SMR (2028), Westinghouse via Poland/Bulgaria [3] |
| **US gas turbine** | Actively discussing with multiple datacentre developers; targeting **first US order in 2025** [4]. Discussions reportedly cover **10 gas turbines / ~8 GW** for US datacentre customers [15] | New growth path layered on top of nuclear [4] |

This is what CLSA captures with the title "**Half nuclear half amazing**" — the nuclear cycle is real; the gas-turbine optionality is the "amazing" leg [1].

---

## 2. The Backlog-Compounding Math (Why 2028–2029 Earnings Matter More Than 2025)

Nuclear & SMR projects book revenue 4–6 quarters AFTER contract signature, with main-equipment delivery and revenue ramp in **2028+**. CLSA's framework:

- **2024 baseline**: Nuclear orders ₩5.7tn (35.8%) out of ₩15.9tn backlog; nuclear revenue only ~17.6% of parent revenue [19].
- **2029 target**: Nuclear backlog **>₩20tn** (vs. ₩5.7tn in 2024); parent OP can **quadruple to ₩1tn** by 2029 [18].
- **Headline backlog guidance**: ₩36tn by 2029 (announced 7-Feb-2025), driven by nuclear + gas power [7].

Because of this lag, CLSA's May-27-2025 TP lift to ₩47,000 was driven by moving valuation from a **2-year-forward** to a **3-year-forward backlog basis** — *"the major earnings improvement from nuclear power orders will start in 2028"* [5].

**CLSA model (snapshot from 27-May-2025 note):**

| ₩bn | 2024A | 2025CL | 2026CL | 2027CL |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 16,233 | 16,161 | 17,938 | 19,019 |
| Op EBIT | 1,018 | 910 | 1,193 | 1,341 |
| Net profit | 111 | 453 | 640 | 752 |
| EPS (₩) | 174 | 710 | 1,003 | 1,178 |
| PE (x) | 237.9 | 58.4 | 41.4 | 35.2 |
| ROE (%) | 1.5 | 6.1 | 8.5 | 9.8 |

[6]

The 2025–2027 numbers are deliberately modest because they front-load legacy power-plant tail-end work; the inflection is back-end-loaded.

---

## 3. Near-Term Validation — Q1 FY2026 Results (Latest Print)

The most recent quarterly print **beat consensus operationally** but showed continued mix-shift pain:

| Metric (Q1 FY2026, reported 29-Apr-2026) | Reported | StreetAccount cons. |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | KRW 4.261T | KRW 4.152T |
| Operating profit | **KRW 233.51B (beat)** | KRW 214.85B |
| Net income attributable | KRW 758M | KRW 64.06B (significant miss) |

[10]

**Order book dynamics** showed quarter-on-quarter normalization but YoY growth in backlog: **Orders KRW 2.786T (-70.2% q/q)** as Q4 was lumpy; **Backlog KRW 24.134T (+3.8% q/q)** — consistent with the multi-year ramp toward the ₩36tn 2029 target [11][7].

Contrast with the prior 1Q25 print (1-May-2025 CLSA note): OP of ₩142bn was 45.6% below consensus due to **Vietnam coal power project losses** and net debt rising from ₩2.6trn to ₩3.3trn on working capital build; management nonetheless held annual OP guidance of ₩373bn (5.8% OPM), arguing growth-business revenue contribution rises from 54% in 1Q25 to 78% in 4Q25 [14]. The fact that 1Q26 OP came in at ₩233.5bn — already two-thirds of full-year-2025 guided OP — suggests the mix shift is materializing.

---

## 4. Catalyst Path (Stock Has Become an Order-Flow Compounder)

The share-price chart maps near-perfectly to nuclear newsflow events — CLSA documented 26 stock-moving catalysts from Apr-2024 to May-2025 alone, including Czech selection (Jul-2024, "+E"), Trump's order easing nuclear regulatory approvals (23-May-2025, "+Z"), and Bloomberg's reporting Korea could win 43% of 400+ planned global reactors (15-May-2025, "+Y") [7]. **The stock now trades as a derivative of global nuclear-renaissance newsflow**, not its trailing earnings.

**Remaining catalysts the bulls are underwriting:**
- Czech main equipment order to Doosan (likely 2H25, 6 months post the 7-May-2025 main contract signing) [16]
- UAE, Saudi Arabia conventional nuclear orders [3]
- First US gas turbine order in 2025 [4]
- US SMR via NuScale + Romanian SMR ramp [15]
- Westinghouse-routed orders in Poland or Bulgaria [3]
- Korea domestic: 4 i-SMR modules (2028) and 2 conventional units (2029 — 11th Basic Power Plan) [17]

---

## 5. Risk Map (What Could Break the Thesis)

| Risk | CLSA framing |
|---|---|
| **US tariff / political exposure** | Parent-company exposure to US is minimal; nuclear orders coming from Middle East, Europe and Korea, with Westinghouse-coordinated business pointed at European projects. Doosan Bobcat (consolidated subsidiary) generates 70%+ in US, so consolidated FX/tariff sensitivity is via Bobcat. SMR exports to US and gas turbines to US "could see complications in the long term" — too early to quantify [16]. |
| **Domestic policy shift (post-Yoon impeachment)** | Opposition party "is more supportive of SMRs than before" and unlikely to repeat the Moon-era construction halt. Domestic orders booked for 2028–2029 [17]. |
| **Czech contract slippage** | March-2025 initial guidance slipped to mid-2025; actual Doosan order recognition is "six months from the official contract" — so 2H25 booking, not 1H25 [16]. |
| **Legacy project tail (Vietnam coal)** | 1Q25 OP loss on parent caused by Vietnam coal write-down; legacy P&L drag continues through 2025 before growth-mix dominates [14]. |
| **Valuation / momentum** | The 127% 12M / 48.7% 1M rally has already priced in conventional + SMR + the start of US gas-turbine optionality; CLSA explicitly downgraded HC O-PF → O-PF *"on price action"* [1][2][5]. |
| **Shareholder structure** | Doosan Corp 30.4% holder; the 2H24 controversial Bobcat–Robotics share-swap was scrapped after market pushback. Future restructuring overhangs remain a risk, though "enhanced fiduciary duty" should constrain repeats [18][7]. |

---

## 6. The Sell-Side Bull-Bear Spread (As of Latest Snapshot)

| Broker | Date | Rating | Target | Implied upside |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CLSA | 27-May-2025 | O-PF (downgrade from HC O-PF) | ₩47,000 | (Note: CLSA's TP is materially below current spot KRW 112-134k; vintage = May-2025) [1] |
| Haitong | 30-Apr-2026 | Outperform (initiate) | KRW 131,574 | +3% [12] |
| LS Securities (Sally Kim) | 18-May-2026 | Buy (initiate) | KRW 150,000 | +34% [9] |
| **FactSet average (as of 18-May-2026)** | — | — | **KRW 144,032** (range 95,000–195,000) | ~+28% from KRW 112,100 [9] |

The CLSA TP looks dated vs. price action — but the underlying *thesis* (Czech + SMR + US gas turbine + 2028+ backlog ramp) is what the market has been compounding into. **The newer initiations (Haitong, LS) anchor on a TP-range KRW 130–150k, suggesting most house-views see additional upside even after the 360%+ 52-week move, but the dispersion (range KRW 95k–195k) signals high disagreement on terminal nuclear margins / order win-rates.**

---

## 7. Synthesis — Why the Thesis Still Has Legs (and What Would Kill It)

**The thesis works if:**
1. The global nuclear-build cycle is real and not a 6-12-month newsflow head-fake — Trump's 23-May-2025 nuclear deregulation order, Czech contract signing, and Korea's positioning to win ~43% of planned reactors all support this [7];
2. Doosan converts the Czech main contract into ₩3.8trn+ of bookings in 2H25 [13];
3. **At least one US gas turbine order lands in 2025** — this is the highest-impact, most under-modelled catalyst because it unlocks a non-nuclear, datacentre-AI-tied growth vector [4][15];
4. NuScale's commercial SMR pipeline (Romania, US datacentre projects) advances to second-module orders, validating Doosan's 12→18-module capacity ramp [3][15].

**The thesis breaks if:**
1. The Korean opposition government walks back nuclear policy (low probability per CLSA, but non-zero) [17];
2. Czech politics or Westinghouse IP disputes derail KHNP execution (already partly de-risked with the Jan-2025 KHNP–Westinghouse settlement) [7];
3. The Vietnam-coal-style legacy tail repeats — i.e., the mix-shift to growth business stalls and 2025–2027 OP doesn't ramp toward the modelled ₩1.3T in 2027 [14][6];
4. The stock simply runs out of multiple expansion after a 360%+ 52-week move — the most likely near-term risk, and the explicit reason CLSA downgraded HC O-PF to O-PF on 27-May-2025 [1][5].

**Bottom line:** Doosan Enerbility is the cleanest listed proxy for the **convergence of (a) the global nuclear renaissance, (b) the US datacentre power-supply scramble, and (c) Korea's elevated geopolitical role as an "energy-export democracy."** Internal coverage is constructive on the 2-3-year fundamentals but cautious on near-term entry given the rally; the latest sell-side initiations (Haitong, LS Securities) corroborate continued upside from current levels but with a wide bull-bear spread (KRW 95k–195k street range).

---

**Sources**
[1] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF
[2] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Stellar performance section
[3] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — 2025 order update
[4] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Gas turbine potential from US
[5] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Remain positive with new rating
[6] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Financial summary table
[7] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Event timeline
[8] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — 12M price target / valuation
[9] LS Securities initiates 028260.KS, 034020.KS — StreetAccount (18-May-2026)
[10] Doosan Enerbility reports Q1 OP KRW233.51B vs StreetAccount KRW214.85B — StreetAccount (29-Apr-2026)
[11] StreetAccount Metrics Recap – Doosan Enerbility Q1 Earnings — StreetAccount (29-Apr-2026)
[12] Doosan Enerbility initiated outperform at Haitong — StreetAccount (30-Apr-2026)
[13] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (1-May-2025), 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF — Czech project
[14] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (1-May-2025), 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF — 1Q25 operating loss
[15] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward) — CLSA (1-May-2025), 607957818LinqAlpha.PDF — SMR + gas turbine outlook
[16] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (Sanity check) — CLSA (7-Apr-2025), 607955198LinqAlpha.PDF — US exposure
[17] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (Sanity check) — CLSA (7-Apr-2025), 607955198LinqAlpha.PDF — Domestic policy risk
[18] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (Bound to grow; upgrade to HC O-PF) — CLSA (4-Mar-2025), 607952142LinqAlpha.PDF — Backlog quadruple
[19] Doosan Enerbility – HC O-PF (Bound to grow; upgrade to HC O-PF) — CLSA (4-Mar-2025), 607952142LinqAlpha.PDF — Current nuclear portion
[20] Korea nuclear energy (Korea leg quick takeaways) — CLSA (20-May-2025), 607959940LinqAlpha.PDF — Doosan Changwon visit
[21] Doosan Enerbility – O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing) — CLSA (27-May-2025), 607960659LinqAlpha.PDF — Share-price/relative table

## Citations

- [9] **LS Securities initiates 028260.KS, 034020.KS** · news — <https://my.apps.factset.com/viewer-fusion/?_doc_id=sa_story_4685887&_doc_date=2026-05-18&_doc_product=SA>
- [10] **Doosan Enerbility reports Q1 operating profit KRW233.51B vs StreetAccount KRW214.85B** · news — <https://my.apps.factset.com/viewer-fusion/?_doc_id=sa_story_4646178&_doc_date=2026-04-29&_doc_product=SA>
- [11] **StreetAccount Metrics Recap - Doosan Enerbility Q1 Earnings** · news — <https://my.apps.factset.com/viewer-fusion/?_doc_id=sa_story_4646230&_doc_date=2026-04-29&_doc_product=SA>
- [12] **Doosan Enerbility initiated outperform at Haitong** · news — <https://my.apps.factset.com/viewer-fusion/?_doc_id=sa_story_4649541&_doc_date=2026-04-30&_doc_product=SA>

