---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: 01 · Coverage lookup
status: done
latency_ms: 149654
conversation_id: 6d656418-0909-4044-94bd-4175b296c19e
citations: 0
created: 2026-05-31 16:46:38Z
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# Latest CLSA Macro note on Korean semi exports.

## Latest CLSA Macro Note on Korean Semi Exports

**Corpus recency note**: The latest CLSA Macropulse synced in the workspace is dated **30 June 2025**. The most recent CLSA Macropulse with a **dedicated Korean exports section** is **Macropulse — 3 June 2025** (covering the 1 June release of Korea's full-month May 2025 trade data, in which semiconductors are the standing driver of Korean export performance). The preceding pure Korea-exports preview is **Macropulse — 30 April 2025**. Both are authored by Max Kaernfelt (max.kaernfelt@clsa.com).

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### Latest: Macropulse — 3 June 2025 (Korea May 2025 trade)

**Title section: "Northeast Manufacturing PMI & Korean Exports — Better than expected"**

| Korea — May 2025 | Print | April 2025 | Consensus |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exports, % YoY | **−1.3%** | +3.7% | −2.7% |
| Exports, % MoM sa | **−0.9%** | +2.2% | — |
| Imports, % YoY | **−5.3%** | −2.7% | — |
| Imports, % MoM sa | **−1.8%** | −0.7% | — |
| Korea Mfg PMI | **47.7** (rose vs Apr, still <50) | — | — |

**Headline read** [1][2][3]:
- Korea was the **first economy in the region to report May trade data** (1 June release), giving an early indication for regional flows.
- Both exports and imports fell YoY and sequentially, but the decline was **smaller than consensus feared** — consensus expected −2.7% YoY exports, actual −1.3% YoY.
- Trade-war effects are now visible in the hard data, but the **pause in US reciprocal tariffs and progress in US–China and UK trade talks lifted sentiment** from April into May.
- New export orders in Korea's PMI **rose in Apr–May** (vs Taiwan's slipping orders) — CLSA attributes Taiwan's resilience-then-slowdown to AI-application demand rather than tariff dynamics.

**Forward view** [4]:
- US tariff collection has been **incomplete and poorly implemented**, with companies routing exports into **bonded warehouses** to defer tariff payment — this masks the true tariff drag.
- CLSA expects **further slowdown in trade growth, especially in Korea and Japan** (both have large auto sectors exposed to US tariffs, and Trump's **doubling of steel tariffs** adds another headwind).
- **No immediate reprieve**: legal challenges are being escalated to higher (Republican-majority) courts, suggesting tariffs may only be reduced, not removed. Korea is expected to land at a negotiated outcome with lower-but-not-removed tariffs.
- CLSA **forecasts lower (but still positive) export growth for Korea in 2025**.

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### Prior dedicated Korea note: Macropulse — 30 April 2025 (April export preview)

This was the more recent **Korea-specific** Macropulse with explicit semiconductor read.

**Setup** [5]:
- First 20 days of April exports: **−5.2% YoY** (vs +4.4% YoY in March's first 20 days); **−3.2% MoM sa** sequentially.
- In level terms, **first-20-day exports were the lowest since September 2024** — the first hard sign of trade-war impact on the region.

**CLSA model output** [6]:
- Regression of YoY change in first-20-day exports vs full-month exports (R² ≈ 0.78) implies a **fitted April full-month estimate of −4.6% YoY** (down from +3% in March), or **−3.8% MoM sa** after seasonal adjustment for Lunar New Year.
- Consensus at the time was −1.6% YoY, so CLSA flagged a **significant downside surprise risk** into the 1 May release.

**Semi-specific takeaway**: The sector breakdown in this note showed **semiconductors (which are tariff-exempt) rising YoY**, while most other major goods categories fell — consistent with early tariff effects depressing non-exempt categories while chips held up structurally. The actual May print (−1.3% YoY, beating consensus) suggests semis continued to cushion the headline, in line with the persistence of AI-driven demand referenced in the 3 June note.

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### Key takeaways for a Korea semi-exports read

1. **Korean semis remain the structural cushion** in headline export data — they are US tariff-exempt and benefit from AI capex demand, evidenced by April first-20-day data and the better-than-expected May print [1][6].
2. **Non-semi categories are where the trade-war damage is showing up first** — autos and steel are direct tariff targets [4].
3. **2H25 risk**: CLSA flags that tariff implementation gaps (bonded warehouses, partial collection) are masking the true drag, and expects export growth to slow further in 2H25 as those gaps close [4].
4. The **Singapore Macropulse companion notes** (16 May, 18 June, 27 June) consistently flag that **South Korea is a major destination for Singapore's specialised-machinery and semiconductor-equipment exports** — i.e., Korean fabs were still capacity-expanding amid firm AI demand through April/May, supporting Korea's chip supply side.

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**Sources**
[1] *Macropulse — 3 June 2025* — CLSA (2 June 2025) — Northeast Mfg PMI & Korean Exports — better than expected — 607961039LinqAlpha.PDF
[2] *Macropulse — 3 June 2025* — CLSA (2 June 2025) — Korea May trade data: exports −1.3% YoY, −0.9% MoM sa — 607961039LinqAlpha.PDF
[3] *Macropulse — 3 June 2025* — CLSA (2 June 2025) — Korea trade, % YoY table — 607961039LinqAlpha.PDF
[4] *Macropulse — 3 June 2025* — CLSA (2 June 2025) — Tariff implementation gaps, bonded warehouses, 2025 export forecast — 607961039LinqAlpha.PDF
[5] *Macropulse — 30 April 2025* — CLSA (29 April 2025) — Korea April Export Preview — first 20 days −5.2% YoY — 607957570LinqAlpha.PDF
[6] *Macropulse — 30 April 2025* — CLSA (29 April 2025) — Regression methodology: fitted April full-month −4.6% YoY, −3.8% MoM sa — 607957570LinqAlpha.PDF

