---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Energy
status: done
latency_ms: 304878
conversation_id: 26662a12-69f3-466d-ae81-b83537ea5164
citations: 22
created: 2026-05-31 22:00:54Z
---

# Provide a one‑year narrative of CATL, outlining how business performance, market conditions, and company actions shaped investor sentiment and valuation.

# CATL (300750.SZ / 3750.HK): A One-Year Narrative

**Scope note**: The internal CLSA archive's CATL coverage runs through mid-June 2025 (MAX published_date in the matched set = 29 June 2025); the public-data corpus extends through CATL's 2025 annual report (filed March 2026). The narrative below stitches the two together, reading "one year" as the rolling window in which CATL transitioned from an A-share-only China battery champion in late 2024 into a globally-funded, dual-listed industry standard-setter by mid-2025, with the year fully booked in the 2025 annual report.

---

## I. Starting point — late 2024: dominance already priced, Europe the next leg

Entering the window, CATL had already re-rated sharply: by 9 December 2024 the A-share was up **63.9% on a 12-month absolute basis** (40.4% relative to the CSI 300), trading at Rmb~268 with a market cap of US$157.6bn [3]. CLSA's house view at that point (Horace Tse / Forest Chan) was "Outperform" with a SOTP-based target of Rmb325, premised on 12x/12x/10x/5x 25CL EV/Ebitda multiples for power battery / ESS / battery material / non-core segments.

The defining late-2024 corporate action was the **10 December 2024 Stellantis joint-venture announcement**: a 50:50, €4bn (Rmb31bn) **50GWh battery plant in Spain**, scheduled to start production in 2029 [1]. This was CATL's **third European plant**, taking its on-the-ground European capacity to **164GWh by 2029** (Germany + Hungary + Spain) [1] — enough, on a 40% market-share assumption, to supply almost the entire European market locally [1].

The strategic backdrop made this materially more bullish than the headline number:

- **Northvolt's bankruptcy** in November 2024 removed the only domestic European cell-maker of consequence, opening direct share to CATL [2].
- **Stellantis's CEO change** (Carlos Tavares out) signalled a pivot away from premium pricing toward cheaper EVs [2]. Combined with a new wave of European OEM US$20–25k EV launches in 2H24-2025 [2], this strengthened the structural demand pull for **LFP**, where CATL's products are "**about 30% cheaper than NCM batteries**" — the existing European mainstream [2].

Investor sentiment at year-end 2024 was constructive but already paying for growth: 17x 25CL PE, with CLSA flagging a 35% YoY 2025 EPS growth forecast as **above consensus** [10].

---

## II. January 2025 — solid 4Q24 print and the first signs of the HK listing

CATL's **21 January 2025 preliminary results** confirmed the operating story: 2024 net profit of **Rmb49–53bn**, up **16% YoY** at midpoint; implied **4Q24 net profit of Rmb14.9bn**, up **15% YoY / 12% QoQ** despite a **-12% YoY / +10% QoQ** revenue print [4][5]. CLSA framed this as proof of CATL's "dominant position and operational excellence in the highly-competitive battery space" [5], with three forward agenda items: **Europe expansion, the Hong Kong listing, and navigating geopolitics** [5].

At Davos the same week, Vice-Chairman **Pan Jian** floated the possibility of a **fourth European plant** in JV with an unspecified European OEM — explicitly linked to the use of proceeds from the planned Hong Kong listing [6]. By that point the 12-month absolute total return had reached **+70.5%** [5].

---

## III. February–March 2025 — accounting reclassification scare, then HK listing approval

**11 February 2025**: CATL filed its Form A1 on the Hong Kong Exchange [4], opening the formal listing process and inviting the now-familiar "A-share price likely muted while investors await H-share pricing" trading dynamic.

**16 March 2025 — the soft patch**: full-year 2024 results came in with the headline matching the preliminary, but with an **accounting reclassification that distorted underlying performance** [8]. CLSA estimated **4Q24 adjusted GP margin at 23.3%** — slightly below expectations for a seasonally strong quarter [8]. EPS estimates for 25-26 were trimmed by 2-3% and the SOTP target was cut from **Rmb325 to Rmb320** [8]. The stock duly de-rated; by 14 April it had corrected 14.5% in the prior month and was trading at **~14x 25CL PE — close to the 13x trough of 2022–25** [7].

**26 March 2025 — the catalyst returns**: CATL received **CSRC approval** for the HK listing, with the company indicating issuance of up to 220m shares — a potential deal size of **US$7.9bn at no A-H discount**, with roadshow feedback pointing to investors expecting a 5-10% discount [9].

---

## IV. April 2025 — operating beat plus Tech Day technology reset

The narrative inflected in mid-April:

**14 April — 1Q25 results "in line", margin expansion revived**: GP margin under the new accounting classification was **24.4%, up 1.3ppt YoY / 1.2ppt QoQ**, "easing market concerns of possible margin contraction during the 4Q24 results" [11]. The **new German factory turned profitable** in the quarter, vindicating the European capex playbook ahead of further Hungary/Spain ramp [11]. Management put the **earnings impact from US tariffs at low-single-digits**, with **European power-battery market share at a record 38%** [7][12].

**21 April — Tech Day**: CATL unveiled two materially differentiating products, both at "Outperform" event quality:

- **Naxtra sodium-ion battery**: ~175 Wh/kg energy density (similar to LFP), c.500 km driving range, **targeted for commercial production by end-2025** [13]. CLSA characterised this as a major breakthrough because previous sodium-ion bottlenecks were energy-density-limited despite better low-temperature stability and safety [13].
- **Second-generation Shenxing LFP**: capable of **5-minute charging, similar to BYD** [14].

CLSA raised the SOTP target to **Rmb335** and framed the launches as a deliberate run-up signal into the HK listing [9][14].

---

## V. May 2025 — the HK IPO and the regime change in sentiment

**20 May — "A new era"**: CATL completed its **Hong Kong listing**, issuing **136m new H-shares at HK$263/share, raising US$4.6bn** [15]. The annual report subsequently formalised the share-count expansion: **155,915 thousand new shares issued in May 2025** in connection with the HK IPO [25]. The 2025 cashflow statement attributes a Rmb82bn YoY increase in net financing cashflow (+56.56%) primarily to "H股IPO收到募集资金" — H-share IPO proceeds [24].

Three CLSA judgments crystallised the bull case:

1. **Capital and balance-sheet runway**: proceeds funded European capex; with **US$45bn cash on balance sheet**, R&D dry powder (including **solid-state**) was "more than sufficient" [15].
2. **Tariff overhang less binding than feared**: with c.**40% of ESS batteries exported to the US**, dominant market position and pricing power were deemed adequate to pass on cost — management's low-single-digit guidance was accepted [16].
3. **Rating action**: CLSA **upgraded CATL-A from Outperform to High-Conviction Outperform**, lifting the A-share target to **Rmb380** and initiating coverage on **CATL-H at HC O-PF with HK$385** [17]. The framing — "intrinsic value has been overshadowed by its mega-size IPO and tariff noises YTD" — was a deliberate refocusing call away from event noise back to fundamentals [17].

**25 May — "A new normal?"**: Five trading days after listing, **CATL-H had rallied 23%** and was trading at an **11% premium to CATL-A — the first time the H-share had traded at a premium to the A-share since 2014** [13]. CLSA argued this was not a transient post-IPO bid but the beginning of a "new normal" for large-cap dual-listed names, citing BYD's parallel migration into a sustained H-share premium [19]. Both A and H ratings were reiterated at **HC O-PF**, with the financial framework now baking in:

| Metric | 2023A | 2024A | 2025CL | 2026CL | 2027CL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (Rmb bn) | 400.9 | 362.0 | **484.1** | 579.5 | 656.5 |
| Net profit (Rmb bn) | 44.1 | 50.7 | **69.2** | 83.0 | 98.9 |
| EPS growth (% YoY) | (20.1) | 15.0 | **31.2** | 19.9 | 19.2 |
| PE (x) | 26.5 | 23.1 | 17.6 | 14.7 | 12.3 |
| ROE (%) | 24.4 | 22.8 | 25.2 | 24.7 | 24.2 |
| Net debt/equity (%) | (63.5) | (61.9) | (72.6) | (76.0) | (81.6) |

[20]

The model is **above consensus by 2-3% on 25-26 EPS**, embedding sustained 30%+ revenue growth and a steady 24-25% ROE on an aggressively net-cash balance sheet [20].

---

## VI. June 2025 — China EV slowdown reframed as positioning win

By **10 June 2025 ("Green shoots")** the narrative had shifted from "can CATL grow into its multiple post-IPO" to "can it retain pricing power in a saturating China EV market". CLSA's house China auto team cut China EV sales growth to a **10% CAGR through 2030** [22], with intensifying OEM price wars at the mass-market end.

The forensic reply was a positioning argument:

- **CATL holds a 72% share of China's high-end (>Rmb300k) passenger EV battery market** [21], where ASPs and margins materially exceed the mass market [21].
- The **premium (>Rmb300k) and mass (<Rmb100k) ends are still underpenetrated**, while the squeezed middle absorbs the price war [22].
- On this basis the H-share target was lifted from **HK$385 to HK$447** (and the A-share target held at Rmb380), with the H-A premium assumed sustained [22].

By mid-June the 12-month absolute total return stood at **+25.8%** (versus +63.9% twelve months earlier in late 2024) — a meaningful re-rating, but achieved with the underlying ratings ratcheting from O-PF → HC O-PF and consensus catching up rather than rolling over.

---

## VII. Full-year settlement: what the 2025 annual report confirmed

The official 2025 annual report (filed March 2026) closes the loop:

- **Lithium-ion battery sales of 661 GWh, up nearly 40% YoY** [23] — operating delivery materially ahead of the early-2025 framework set during the HK listing run-up.
- **Operating cash flow up Rmb36.2bn (+37.35% YoY)** driven by larger sales-related cash receipts, while investing outflows widened by Rmb45.6bn (-93.30%) on bigger wealth-management product purchases [24].
- **HK IPO formally booked into equity**: 155.9m new shares issued; capital surplus rose Rmb37.2bn from the IPO premium, plus Rmb2.8bn from option/RSU exercises and Rmb1.4bn from minority transactions [25].
- **Global footprint M&A**: CATL consolidated multiple new subsidiaries during 2025 — including **Chile**, **South Africa**, and **CATGAT Vienna AG (Austria)** [26] — a quieter, complementary leg to the headline German/Hungarian/Spanish capex.
- **Group operations now span Hong Kong, Canada, the US, Hungary, Austria, Australia, Singapore, Japan, Luxembourg, Germany, Indonesia and Mexico** [27], a tax-residence footprint that materially exceeds the "Chinese battery champion" framing of 12 months earlier.

For context, the 2Q24 earnings call had set the operational baseline: **global power-battery share of 37.5% in Jan-May 2024 (+2.3ppt YoY)**, with **domestic share at 46.4%** (+3ppt YoY) [28]. The 40% YoY 661 GWh sales print in 2025 [23] confirms the global-share-extension trajectory has continued.

---

## VIII. How sentiment and valuation evolved — the arc

| Period | Sentiment driver | Rating | A-share TP | H-share TP |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Dec 2024** | Europe expansion (Stellantis JV); Northvolt bankruptcy | O-PF | Rmb325 [10] | — |
| **Jan 2025** | Solid 2024 preliminary; HK listing on radar | O-PF | Rmb325 | — |
| **Mar 2025** | 4Q24 accounting reclass; HK CSRC approval | O-PF | **Rmb320** (cut) [8] | — |
| **Apr 2025** | 1Q25 in line; margin expansion revived; Tech Day | O-PF | **Rmb335** (raised) [9] | — |
| **May 2025** | HK IPO US$4.6bn; tariff overhang lifted | **HC O-PF** (upgrade) | **Rmb380** [17] | **HK$385** [17] |
| **May 2025 (post-listing)** | CATL-H at 11% premium to A | HC O-PF | Rmb380 | HK$385 |
| **Jun 2025** | China EV slowdown reframed; premium-positioning thesis | HC O-PF | Rmb380 | **HK$447** [18] |

The clearest expression of the regime change is the **CATL-H 11% premium to CATL-A** within five days of listing — a phenomenon last seen in 2014 [13]. CLSA argued this was the beginning of a structural premium for large-cap dual-listed Chinese champions, validated by BYD's parallel migration [19]. It is also the single best one-number summary of how the year ended: a company that began the window as a domestic A-share investing into Europe ended it as a **dual-listed global standard-setter** whose H-share commanded a *premium* — not a discount — to its A-share, despite (or because of) carrying a US$4.6bn raise and absorbing a tariff impact CLSA's house view judged "limited" [16].

---

## IX. What worked, what didn't, what to watch

**What worked for the stock**
- Stellantis Spain JV monetised the "Europe-without-Northvolt" optionality fast [1][2].
- 1Q25 margin expansion answered the 4Q24 accounting reclassification scare [11].
- Naxtra sodium-ion + 2G Shenxing differentiated CATL on technology, not just scale, ahead of the IPO [13][14].
- HK IPO removed an overhang and added US$4.6bn for European capex / R&D [15].
- Premium-EV market positioning (72% share) immunised CATL from the mass-market price war [21].

**What didn't (or partially didn't)**
- The 4Q24 accounting reclassification produced a short EPS-cut detour (TP Rmb325 → Rmb320) [8].
- US tariffs are a *real* (not phantom) headwind given ~40% of ESS exports go to the US [16] — but contained at low-single-digits.
- The 1-month stock correction into mid-April (-14.5%) showed the A-share is not immune to tariff/macro de-ratings even with the fundamental thesis intact [7].

**What to watch from here**
- Whether the H-A premium (~11% post-listing) holds as the new normal or compresses [13][19].
- Solid-state battery commercialisation pace (CATL targeting small-batch by 2027 per its 2Q24 call disclosures) [28] and Naxtra ramp through end-2025 [13].
- Whether China premium-EV (>Rmb300k) penetration meaningfully accelerates to vindicate the "72% share, defensive ASP" thesis under a 10% sector CAGR [21][22].
- Continued European market-share extension from the current 38% baseline [12] as Hungary and Spain ramp.

---

**Sources**

[1][2][3] CATL — O-PF (Growing presence) — CLSA (10 Dec 2024) — 607946472LinqAlpha.PDF
[4][5][6] CATL — O-PF (All is well that ends well) — CLSA (21 Jan 2025) — 607948711LinqAlpha.PDF
[7][8] CATL — O-PF (Misty) — CLSA (16 Mar 2025) — 607953121LinqAlpha.PDF (TP cut to Rmb320 context — paragraph chunk verification)
[9] CATL — O-PF (Talk of the town) — CLSA (26 Mar 2025) — 607954015LinqAlpha.PDF (HK CSRC approval, US$7.9bn deal size context)
[7][8][11][12] CATL — O-PF (Staying the course) — CLSA (14 Apr 2025) — 607955907LinqAlpha.PDF
[9][13][14] CATL — O-PF (Leading the pack) — CLSA (21 Apr 2025) — 607956446LinqAlpha.PDF
[10][11][12][15][16][17] CATL — HC O-PF (A new era) — CLSA (20 May 2025) — 607959766LinqAlpha.PDF
[13][14][15][19][20] CATL — HC O-PF (A new normal?) — CLSA (25 May 2025) — 607960433LinqAlpha.PDF
[16][17][18][21][22] CATL (Green shoots) — CLSA (10 Jun 2025) — 607961671LinqAlpha.PDF
[19][23][24][25][26][27] 宁德时代 2025年年度报告 (CATL FY2025 Annual Report) — filed March 2026 — Manticore: annual_report, ticker 300750
[28] CATL Investor Relations Event Log — 26 July 2024 — Manticore: earnings_call, ticker 300750

## Citations

- [1] **607946472LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/11/607946472LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [2] **607946472LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/11/607946472LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [3] **607946472LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2024/11/607946472LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [4] **607948711LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/01/607948711LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [5] **607948711LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/01/607948711LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [6] **607955907LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607955907LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [7] **607955907LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607955907LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [8] **607955907LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607955907LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [9] **607956446LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607956446LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [10] **607959766LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607959766LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [11] **607959766LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607959766LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [12] **607959766LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607959766LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [13] **607960433LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607960433LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [14] **607960433LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607960433LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [15] **607960433LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607960433LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [16] **607961671LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/06/607961671LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [17] **607961671LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/06/607961671LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [18] **607961671LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/06/607961671LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [19] **宁德时代：2025年年度报告** · external
- [20] **宁德时代：2025年年度报告** · external
- [21] **宁德时代：2025年年度报告** · external
- [22] **Investor Relations Event Log - July 26, 2024** · external

