---
endpoint: analytics
pattern: Capital Goods
status: done
latency_ms: 250680
conversation_id: 2e2d0982-c178-4dba-bc05-47b5dbcb9510
citations: 12
created: 2026-05-31 21:38:20Z
---

# How does Doosan Enerbility’s valuation compare to peers, and what justifies its premium/discount?

# Doosan Enerbility (034020 KS) — Valuation vs Peers

**Current state**: Doosan Enerbility (DE) rallied **127.3% over the past year (+48.7% in the past month before the latest CLSA note dated 27-May-2025), driven by positive newsflow on global nuclear power expansion** [3]. CLSA downgraded the rating one notch to O-PF (from HC O-PF) purely on price action while *raising* the SOTP target price from ₩34,000 to **₩47,000** [2].

---

## 1. Where DE trades vs global peers (CLSA peer comp, May 2025)

DE looks **expensive on PE, in line on EV/EBITDA, and cheap on P/B & ROE** — depending on which lens you use.

**Global comps table from CLSA MHI note (priced 9-May-2025) [4]**:

| Company | PE 25 | PE 26 | EV/EBITDA 25 | EV/EBITDA 26 | P/B 25 | P/B 26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Doosan Enerbility** | **43.0x** | **29.9x** | **15.6x** | **13.1x** | **2.3x** | **2.1x** |
| MHI (7011 JP) | 34.1x | 28.4x | 18.6x | 15.0x | 3.5x | 3.5x |
| GE Vernova | 59.3x | 35.9x | 32.4x | 21.8x | 10.2x | 8.5x |
| Siemens AG | n/a | 27.8x | 16.7x | 10.8x | 5.8x | 4.9x |
| Rolls-Royce | 32.5x | 27.6x | 18.0x | 16.0x | n/a | n/a |
| Hanwha Aerospace | 24.6x | 19.8x | 15.6x | 13.3x | 5.4x | 4.3x |
| KAI (047810) | 35.2x | 23.3x | 22.1x | 16.2x | 4.7x | 4.0x |
| **Industrial avg** | **30.7x** | **24.0x** | **17.5x** | **14.4x** | **5.2x** | **4.5x** |

**Direct gas turbine peer set (CLSA Siemens Energy note, 8-May-2025) [5]**:

| Gas Services | PE 25 | PE 26 | PE 27 | EV/EBITDA 25 | EV/EBITDA 26 | EV/EBITDA 27 | P/B 25 | ROE 25 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Doosan Enerbility** | **46.6x** | **32.4x** | **24.8x** | **15.2x** | **12.5x** | **10.6x** | **2.2x** | **4.9%** |
| Mitsubishi Heavy | 36.0x | 30.5x | 26.1x | 19.1x | 17.0x | 15.0x | 4.0x | 11.4% |
| Average | 41.3x | 31.4x | 25.4x | 17.2x | 14.7x | 12.8x | 3.1x | 8.2% |

CLSA's GE Vernova note (12-May-2025) corroborates: DE at **48.4x 25CL PE / 15.6x EV/EBITDA / 2.3x P/B / 4.9% ROE 25** vs MHI 34.1x / 18.2x / 3.8x / 11.4% [6].

---

## 2. Why DE trades at a premium on PE — and a discount on EBITDA / book

### Premium drivers (justify the rich PE & headline rally)

- **Depressed EPS base distorting PE**. DE's 2024 net profit was just ₩111bn (NPM 0.7%) and the operating margin only 3.3% [9]; CLSA models a **+307% EPS jump in 2025E and +41% in 2026E** as legacy low-margin projects roll off, mechanically compressing forward PE from 43x → 30x → 25x [4]. The 2025 PE "premium" is largely an earnings-trough artifact, not a structural quality premium.

- **Best-positioned listed pure-play on the new-build nuclear cycle**. CLSA's three-pillar bull case: (i) unprecedented conventional nuclear order momentum from Czech Republic, Saudi, UAE, US (Westinghouse), giving DE "at least two units of nuclear plant orders per year over the next five years"; (ii) DE is becoming a **global SMR foundry** with contracts from NuScale, X-Energy and TerraPower; and (iii) Korean commercial-code reform on fiduciary duty closes the long-standing governance overhang from Doosan-group restructuring history [7].

- **Margin and ROE inflection visible in the model**. Management targets **8.9% OP margin in 2029 (₩1tn parent OP)**, vs 3.3% in 2024 [9] — and on CLSA forecasts ROE expands from 1.5% (2024) to **6.1% (2025) → 8.5% (2026) → 9.8% (2027)** [10]. The PE looks rich today specifically because it is pricing this through-cycle margin upshift.

- **Capacity and order optionality not yet in numbers**. US gas-turbine talks involve ~10 units (~8 GW) to multiple datacenter developers, with DE pricing currently "1.5x lower" than GE Vernova on domestic contracts but moving closer to peer levels on exports [11].

### Discount drivers (justify the EV/EBITDA, P/B and ROE gaps)

- **Sub-scale in the core competitive arena**. In global heavy-duty gas turbines (DE's secondary-but-cyclically-hot leg), DE holds only **10% market share vs MHI 33%, GE 31%, Siemens 26%** [8]. The peer leaders therefore command higher EBITDA multiples (MHI 18.6x, GEV 32.4x, Siemens 16.7x) than DE (15.6x) because scale advantage + installed-base service annuity remain stronger with the incumbents.

- **Holdco / SOTP drag, not pure-play multiple**. CLSA explicitly values DE on **sum-of-the-parts (₩47k TP)** rather than a clean operating multiple: operations at **0.99x EV-to-2028 backlog (₩30.7tn)**, plus a stake-weighted basket of listed/unlisted investments (Doosan Bobcat 46.1%, Doosan Fuel Cell 34.8%, NuScale 1.8%, Doosan Cuvex 100%, Doosan Škoda Power) — and crucially applies a **50% holdco discount to investment assets** before deducting ₩2.21tn net debt [1][2]. The TP math leans on the secondary cross-check of a **13.2x global peer multiple on forward NOPAT** [1].

- **Quality of book / depressed returns**. P/B of 2.3x is well below the 5.2x peer average [4] because ROE is 4.9% in 2025E vs MHI 11.4%, Hitachi 11.1%, ABB 29.1%, Schneider 16.3% [5][6]. EBITDA margin of 8.7% in 2025E (vs 9.3% in 2024) is also below MHI / GEV / Siemens. CLSA's own EVA® work shows DE earning a **negative spread**: ROIC 2.5% vs WACC 8.2% in 2025E (EVA −₩1,377bn) — a fundamental reason book and EBITDA multiples can't yet support a true premium.

- **Legacy 1Q losses and revenue completion drag**. 1Q25 OP came in ₩142bn, 45.6% below consensus on a Vietnam coal-power project loss; revenue target was cut to ₩6.5tn for 2025 [12]. The market is willing to look through these on the order-book story, but the EV/EBITDA discount to MHI/Siemens reflects that DE has to *prove* the margin migration before it gets re-rated to peer parity.

---

## 3. CLSA's framework — and what the market is paying for

CLSA's primary valuation lens is **EV/Backlog 0.99x** (up from 0.79x), arguing today's backlog is the cleanest forward-looking read because: (a) nuclear projects span 5–7 years, so backlog leads revenue; (b) the company guides backlog to grow from ₩5.7tn (2024) to **₩36tn by 2029** [7]; and (c) parent OP could quadruple to ₩1tn by 2029 as the nuclear-power mix swings the margin curve. The 0.99x multiple was derived from 2021 levels, "when nuclear momentum started to take off" — i.e., CLSA is comping DE against its *own historical re-rating peak*, not against MHI/GEV.

In other words, the headline PE premium (43x vs 30.7x avg) is **not** the active variable. The active variable is whether 2028 backlog and 2029 ₩1tn OP show up. If they do, DE re-rates lower on PE (organic earnings catch up) and **higher on EBITDA + P/B** (margin and ROE expand toward peer levels). If they don't, the SOTP collapses back toward the ₩34k prior TP (Feb–May 2025 anchor).

---

## 4. Bottom line

| Metric | Doosan vs peers | Verdict | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| **PE 2025E** | 43.0x vs 30.7x avg → **+40% premium** | Premium | Trough EPS base distorting optics; +307% EPS growth 2025E |
| **PE 2027E** | 24.8x (Gas Services group) vs 25.4x avg | At parity | Normalised once margin recovers |
| **EV/EBITDA 25E** | 15.6x vs 17.5x avg → **−11% discount** | Discount | Lower EBITDA margin (8.7%) and smaller scale (10% gas turbine share) |
| **P/B 25E** | 2.3x vs 5.2x avg → **−56% discount** | Discount | Sub-cost-of-equity ROE (4.9% vs peer 8.2–18.9%); negative EVA spread |
| **Implied EV/Backlog** | 0.99x (up from 0.79x) | Premium vs own history | Anchored to 2021 nuclear-cycle peak; pricing in ₩36tn 2029 backlog |

**Net verdict from CLSA's evidence base**: DE's premium on PE is *circumstantial* (depressed earnings base), its discount on book/EV-EBITDA is *fundamental* (sub-scale, low ROE, holdco structure), and the real bull thesis is paid for via the EV/Backlog and SOTP framework, not via traditional multiples. The 127% YTD rally has already pulled the share price (₩42,700 last close before the May-27 note) close to the new ₩47k TP (~10% upside) [2][3], hence CLSA's downgrade from HC O-PF to O-PF.

---

**Sources**
[1] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing), 607960659 — CLSA (27-May-2025)
[2] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing), 607960659 — CLSA (27-May-2025) — SOTP table (₩47k TP)
[3] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing), 607960659 — CLSA (27-May-2025) — Rally drivers
[4] MHI — HLD (Orderly reaction), 607958834 — CLSA (9-May-2025) — Global defence/industrial comps
[5] Siemens Energy — O-PF (Powerhouse), 607958656 — CLSA (8-May-2025) — Gas Services peer table
[6] GE Vernova — HC O-PF (Flourishing future), 607958998 — CLSA (12-May-2025) — Power peer table
[7] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (Bound to grow), 607952142 — CLSA (4-Mar-2025) — Three-pillar upgrade rationale
[8] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF (One step back for two steps forward), 607957818 — CLSA (1-May-2025) — Gas turbine market shares
[9] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (₩36tn backlog in 2029), 607950904 — CLSA (17-Feb-2025) — Margin trajectory
[10] Doosan Enerbility — O-PF (Half nuclear half amazing), 607960659 — CLSA (27-May-2025) — Balance-sheet ratios / ROE path
[11] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF, 607957818 — CLSA (1-May-2025) — GEV pricing comparison
[12] Doosan Enerbility — HC O-PF, 607957818 — CLSA (1-May-2025) — 1Q25 SOTP

*Note: All cited evidence is from CLSA's RMS-indexed research. CLSA's latest note (27-May-2025) is the most recent in the corpus; the Doosan Enerbility-specific peer comp table in that note was not surfaced separately — the peer-multiple table above is reconstructed from CLSA's May-2025 MHI/Siemens Energy/GE Vernova notes priced within the same week.*

## Citations

- [1] **607960659LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607960659LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [2] **607960659LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607960659LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [3] **607960659LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607960659LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [4] **607958834LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607958834LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [5] **607958656LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607958656LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [6] **607958998LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/04/607958998LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [7] **607952142LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/03/607952142LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [8] **607957818LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607957818LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [9] **607950904LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/02/607950904LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [10] **607960659LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607960659LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [11] **607957818LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607957818LinqAlpha.PDF>
- [12] **607957818LinqAlpha.PDF** · clsa — <s3://ext-linq-rms-clsa/2025/05/607957818LinqAlpha.PDF>

